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Economies vary in their reliance on public or private capital accumulation, and 
this variation has long been believed to lead to different distribution outcomes. 
In this paper, we take the share of public capital in total capital stock and 
public capital per GDP as the main explanatory variables. We then estimate 
the effect that capital ownership has on income inequality by using a panel data 
consisting of 145 economies in the period from 1980 to 2015. Our empirical 
results show that a higher ratio of public capital in total capital stock could 
lower the Gini coefficients of both original and disposable income distribution. 
Furthermore, we note that public capital per GDP is a sound measurement of 
public investment’s accumulative contribution to the economy and find that it 
reduces income inequality, while private capital per GDP affects income 
inequality in the opposite direction. Accounting for the heterogeneity in 
development level, we further find that the negative effect that public capital 
has on income inequality is much more salient among low- and middle-income 
countries. 
Keywords 
Public capital, income inequality, redistribution. 





Public capital and income inequality: some empirical 
evidence1 
1 Introduction 
In the past several decades, rising income inequality has been an alarming 
phenomenon in almost all parts of the world.2 Indeed, income inequality has 
increased rapidly in both industrialized countries and developing ones since the 
1980s (except that most Latin American countries, after recording the highest 
level in the world for decades, have experienced a mild decrease of income 
inequality since the beginning of the new century). Despite overall economic 
growth in most parts of the world, the living standards of the poor have 
stagnated and even worsened in some cases (Stiglitz, 2012; p18). Due to this 
rising inequality, the relevancy of using mean income to measure the living 
standards of the whole population has been called into question (Atkinson, 
1997). Contrary to classical theories emphasizing inequality’s positive impact on 
savings, investments, and, thus, growth (Kuznets, 1955), some recent studies in 
the literature have focused on market imperfection (Galor and Zeira, 1993), 
weak demand from the poor, capital outflow, and mechanisms of political 
economy to establish a negative association between inequality and growth 
(Aghion et al., 1999). Moreover, this new research has attempted to show that 
economic inequality is detrimental to other development goals. For example, 
Easterly (2007) notes that income inequality has driven underdevelopment, and 
Murshed and Gates (2005), using conflict data from Nepal, show that income 
inequality is the main contributor to internal conflicts. Due to the unwanted 
social and political repercussions of the rising inequality, governments and 
international organizations have put reducing inequality as one of the top 
priorities in their agenda. 
The causes of income inequality have been studied at least since Kuznets 
(1955), and the early researches usually took a labor perspective. According to 
Kuznets (1955), wages would first rise in the manufacturing sector, causing the 
wage differential between manufacturing and other sectors to increase; wages in 
the service sector would then rise as the demand for service increases and the 
wage differential would narrow along with the economic development. 
Subsequently, as argued by Katz and Krueger (1991) among others, both the 
trend of the rising share of employment in the private sector and de-unionization 
could increase income inequality. Among the recent research on economic 
inequality, the rapid increases of the top decile/percentile income share in both 
OECD countries and other countries (Piketty and Saez, 2006; Roine et al., 2009) 
have been recognized as the most important component in the trend of rising 
inequality for the last several decades. While labors’ allocation in the private and 
public sectors has been factored in, the equity effect of the allocation of capital 
in the private and public sectors has been under-investigated. As wage 
 
1 Corresponding author: yanbai@iss.nl (Y. Li), murshed@iss.nl (S.M. Murshed), 
papyrakis@iss.nl (E. Papyrakis) 
2 See in the World Inequality Report (2018). 
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differentials resulting from the last information-technology-industry revolution 
have been insufficient in explaining the huge increase of top income shares, two 
other major driving forces for the last wave of rising inequality have been 
included: rising rents from private capital (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Piketty, 2015; 
Piketty et al., 2019) and institutional settings (Angeles, 2007; Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007; Milanovic, 2019).  
Apart from the direct equity effect of private capital disparity (Piketty, 
2015), the accumulation of private capital relative to public capital could affect 
income inequality through other mechanisms, namely, capital market 
imperfection, public goods investment, and the political lobbying by large 
private corporates and super-rich individuals. Capital market imperfection 
(Banerjee and Newman (1991); Galor and Zeira, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray, 
2003; Piketty, 1997) has led to a lack of human capital investment of the poor, 
while the insufficient provision of public goods and infrastructure investment 
has deprived the production opportunity of the poor (Shell, 1966; Clarida and 
Findlay, 1992). The capital stock of an economy may affect tax and 
redistribution policies, as being the dominance interest of private capital, an 
increase in private capital stock would lead to much more lobbying for tax 
reduction and for less redistributive policies (i Vidal et al., 2012). Thus, the 
exclusively private-owned capital can usually transform into political disparity by 
establishing wealth-favored institutions and, as a result, political disparity could 
also materialize into economic disparity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).  
Due to the imperfection in the capital market, the pro-poor growth effect 
by infrastructure investment, and the counter-redistributive consequences of 
political lobbying by large private corporates and wealthy individuals, we 
hypothesize that a larger public capital presence in the economy could curb 
income inequality. We use two measures to gauge capital ownership, namely, 
public capital share (the ratio between public capital and total capital stock) and 
public capital per GDP. We also substitute the dependent variable with those 
from other data sources to conduct a robustness test and use different 
measurements of institutional quality to test the sensitivity of our model.  
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to use capital stock data 
to estimate how capital ownership contributes to cross-country variation in 
income inequality. The most relevant work for our study is from Sturm and De 
Haan (2015); using a composite index of economic freedom from the Fraser 
Institute as an indicator of the capitalist economy, they test whether a capitalist 
economy or ethnolinguistic fractionalization would lead to more equitable 
income redistribution. However, their results are opposite to ours. They find 
that economic freedom does not affect market income inequality, whereas our 
results show clearly that a larger public capital presence has a consistently 
negative effect on market income inequality. They also find that, for countries 
with a low degree of fractionalization, a more capitalist economy could result in 
larger income redistribution; in contrast, we find no effect of capital ownership 
on income redistribution. The contradictory results of these two studies show 
that the metrics used to gauge the capitalist economy is crucial in determining 
the relationship between the capitalist economy and income inequality.  
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This paper is structured as follows: a brief literature review is given in 
section (2); this is followed by descriptive statistics of data and econometric 
method in section (3); we then show our main regression results and robust tests 




2 Literature review 
Several channels have been elucidated in theoretical studies regarding the nexus 
between capital ownership and inequality. Among the literature examining the 
nexus between public investment and inequality, infrastructure investment 
(consisting of most public investment) provides a large proportion. As for the 
literature on the association between public capital and growth (Romp and De 
Haan, 2007; Gupta et al., 2014), most theoretical studies treat public capital as 
an input in the Solow model or the AK model to examine the dynamics between 
public capital, growth, and distribution. Shell (1966) treats technical change as a 
public good that is produced by inventive activities, and Clarida and Findlay 
(1992) further emphasize the role of government in such inventive activity when 
government becomes the provider of education, research, and communication 
infrastructure, et cetera. With the view that public provision of education is 
believed to have a positive effect on equality, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) 
find that public education contributes to the equality of human capital through 
an overlapping generational model in which the only inheritance is an 
educational investment that parents leave for their children. Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky (2012) integrated different financing paths of government spending 
on infrastructure into an AK model with heterogeneous agents, showing that 
government expenditure on infrastructure could increase wealth inequality over 
time; they concluded that although it could alleviate income inequality in the 
short run, it would exacerbate it in the long run. The underlying mechanism for 
this conclusion is that public infrastructure investment can enhance the 
productivity of private capital and thus encourage private capital investment 
with a distributional effect in favor of the already capital-rich people.  
The second focus in the literature is on the market imperfection scenario, 
including asymmetric information, moral hazard, and the reverse selection 
problem, which gives rise to market failures in the credit market, insurance 
market, and labor market. Since Gertler and Bernanke (1989) connects the state 
of an agent’s balance sheet to its ability to incur investment, scholars have 
extended the connection to understand how wealth distribution evolves along 
with different generations under market imperfection. In the utility function of 
these models, parents derive utility from the bequest they leave to their 
descendants; thus, an initial wealth inequality is embedded into the model by the 
choice parents make for the professions of their descendants. One stream of 
this literature is the occupational choice theory. Under the condition of 
indivisibility in investment, people without enough bequest from parents are 
unable to borrow money to invest in their human capital, both in an imperfect 
credit market (Galor and Zeira, 1993) and a missing credit market (Mookherjee 
and Ray, 2003); therefore, the initial wealth inequality persists through dynasties 
by different human capital investment from the parents. Furthermore, Banerjee 
and Newman (1991) model how differences in risk-bearing, which result from 
the different bequest of parents, could result in earning differences and even 
poverty traps in an imperfect insurance market. Piketty (1997) pointed out that 
credit market imperfection could lead to credit rationing and a differentiated 
higher interest rate towards capital-poor individuals compared to capital-rich 
ones. Matsuyama (2007) developed a simple and thorough model to examine 
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credit market imperfections’ role on various economic issues, and he finds credit 
rationing acts as an “entry barrier” and thus contends that improvement in the 
credit market will benefit the middle class most.  
Based on the models mentioned above, imperfections in the financial 
market lead to the absence of skill upgrading for the poor (Galor and Zeira, 
1993), the persistence of wealth inequality (Piketty, 1997), and poverty trap 
(Banerjee and Newman, 1991). Public capital then enters into the discussion 
either directly by attenuated credit rationing or by lowering the expected bequest 
which is needed as collateral to invest in human capital or production. In these 
models, public investment has the advantage to compensate credit-constraints 
(Piketty, 1997) or the shortages of public goods (Ferreira, 1995) brought about 
by market failure. When market failure overweighs state failure because of 
capital market imperfection, the government is believed to have a comparative 
advantage in the provision of certain goods and services (Ferreira, 1995), such 
as infrastructure, education, and health services. Since the initial wealth 
inequalities could persist in the weakening of credit-rationing and the reinforcing 
of the insufficient provision of credit to the poor due to market imperfection 
(Piketty, 1997), the main advantage of public capital is to provide services under 
the situation of market failure and private-public capital complementarity 
(Ferreira, 1995). Furthermore, the association of larger credit market barriers 
and higher inequality is also supported by empirical evidence; Brückner et al. 
(2010) found a positive relationship between the income share of the top 1 
percent and interest rate for the 20th century by using time series data from the 
US, the UK, and Sweden. 
Another contributing mechanism through which public and private capital 
disparity affects income inequality has been the difference in the wage structure 
in the private and public sectors. Here, the inequality-reducing effect of the 
public sector has been widely researched. 3  Among which the public sector 
displays much more inflexibility of wage-setting in response to market 
conditions and institutional changes. The reverse trend of unionization and the 
stagnation of minimum wage have been the main reasons behind the disparity 
of wage income in the private sector (Katz and Krueger (1991), which itself is 
the manifestation of the declining bargaining power of normal workers 
compared to big corporations and top managers. Katz and Krueger (1991) claim 
that changes in wage dispersion in the public sector show a contrary pattern 
compared to the private sector during the 1970s and 1980s in the US; whereas 
pay for white-collar workers in the public sector has been relatively stable, pay 
for blue-collar workers has increased dramatically in the federal, state, and local 
governments.   
While there are a large number of empirical studies on the connection 
between public capital and growth (Aschauer, 2000; Gupta et al., 2014), there 
are no empirical studies on the direct connection between public capital and 
inequality. However, as a form of public capital stock, infrastructure stock has 
been tested for its equity effect. Lopez (2003) was the first to test the equity 
effect of infrastructure stock by using telephone lines per capita as an 
 
3 See in the literature review of Lausev (2014). 
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instrumental variable for infrastructure stocks and controlling other growth 
determinants, such as human capital, financial development, and trade openness. 
He found that both infrastructure stocks and education have an inequality-
reduction effect and are pro-growth, while other growth-enhancing factors, i.e. 
financial development, trade openness, and government downsizing, have a 
negative distributive effect. Calderon and Serven (2004) tested the impact of 
infrastructure stocks on growth and inequality, respectively by using a synthetic 
index of infrastructure stocks regarding both quality and quantity. They 
confirmed that infrastructure stocks consistently enhance growth and alleviate 
income inequality, with the quality of infrastructure stocks having a much more 
robust effect than the quantity of infrastructure stocks. A thorough review of 
the effects of infrastructure on growth and inequality can be found in Calderon 
and Serven (2014).  
Change of public capital stock is mainly caused by public investment and 
nationalization (privatization). While public investment contributes to public 
capital accumulation gradually, nationalization (privatization) of corporates 
changes the relative size of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector directly. 
Specifically, in many transitional economies, a large scale and rapid privatization 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are pushed to expand the financial sector, 
and, as a result of such rushed privatization, inequality accelerates (Bildsall and 
Nellis, 2003). Milanovic and Ersado (2012) found that while privatization of 
large-scale enterprises is generally accompanied by the development of the 
financial market, such privatization tends to worsen inequality, whereas 
privatization of small and medium enterprises (SEMS) often generates anti-
inequality factors by improving labor market conditions. In studies focusing on 
the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the privatization wave following it, 
it is noted that most of the benefits that come from privatization were captured 
by insiders in the post-communist former Soviet Union countries (Milanovic 
and Ersado, 2012; Alexeev, 1999). 
In addition to our main explanatory variable, other macroeconomic 
indicators could also affect income inequality. Among those factors, financial 
development has been widely researched. Given the contention of the 
aforementioned theoretical models on financial market imperfections (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993; Piketty, 1997; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003) that the lack of access 
to the credit market has been the main cause of persistent inequality, financial 
development could linearly reduce inequality by expanding the coverage of 
financial services. However, according to the model of Greenwood and 
Jovanavic (1990), the effect of financial development on inequality also depends 
on the level of economic development; in the early phase of development, only 
the rich reaps the benefits of economic and financial development, while the 
poor can only have access to the financial market in the late phase of 
development. Empirical evidence regarding the effect of financial development 
on income inequality is also contradictory. Beck et al. (2007), using private credit 
to GDP ratio as an indication for financial development for around 70 countries 
in the period from 1960 to 2005, found that financial development has a direct 
negative impact on income inequality and poverty headcount. However, using 
an unbalanced panel dataset for a much larger sample of 138 countries, Jauch 
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and Watzka (2016) show that financial development exacerbates income 
inequality.  Claessens and Perotti (2007,) reviewing recent literature on financial 
development and inequality, with a focus on access to finance, argue that initial 
inequality of wealth and political power could result in misallocation in the 
financial market, thereby favoring the rich and diminishing the poor’s economic 
opportunity; thus, inequality becomes persistent. In the recent literature, 
financialization, a term referring to the expansion of the financial sector 
throughout the whole economy, has also been recognized as the main factor 
driving the rise of income inequality in the last 40 years as the financial sector 
has taken a comparatively larger portion of national income than other sectors 
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). 
Moreover, political institutions are important because greater democracy 
has traditionally meant less plutocracy, but this may no longer hold in the current 
political climate of elected populist leadership. As the theoretical model 
developed by Meltzer and Ricahrd (1981) shows, the majority-vote system may 
result in a counterbalancing force towards rising income inequality. Robinson 
and Acemoglu (2000) developed a model based on the view that 
democratization anchors redistributive policies and deceasing inequality follows 
to prevent social unrest. By conducting reduced-form regression, Ressoin and 
Tabellini (2003) show that a well-established democratic institution could have 
a negative effect on income inequality. Recent studies (Angeles, 2007; Chong 
and Gradstein, 2007) have explored the effect of institutional settings on 
inequality, both theoretically and empirically, and have pointed out that weak 
institutional strength could entrench inequality. Acemoglu and Robison (2008) 
further modeled how the change in de jure political power can be offset by the 
investment in de facto power by economic elites. This means that they can 
increase their investment because the cost that elites are facing in a undemocratic 
institutional setting is much lower than in a democratic one, thus making a 
significant change of political institutions much more unlikely. Most recently, 
Milanovic (2019) argues that rising inequality in the United States is also resulting 
from the capture of political institutions by rich individuals, not just the 
traditional corporations, which renders a new kind of rentier capitalism different 
from the manufacturing capitalism of the Kuznets process. Beside those 
institutional indicators measuring democratic development, lower 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is also associated with much more sizeable 
income distribution, especially in capitalist economies (Sturm and De Haan, 
2015). Moreover, ethnic divisions have been proven to lessen the provision of 
public goods in both theoretical (Becker, 1957) and empirical research, from 
evidence both in developed (Alesina et al., 1999) and developing countries 
(Gershman and Rivera, 2005).  
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3 Data, summary statistics, and econometric methods 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
In the paper, we use adjusted public capital stock data from “IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock Dataset, 2017”, which has been used by Gupta et al., (2014) 
to test the effect that efficiency-adjusted public capital has on growth. In this 
dataset, the public Investment management index (PIMI) from Dabla-Norris et 
al., (2012) is used to adjust public investment series in a perpetual inventory 
equation with the methodology adopted by Kamps (2006). 4 Equation (1) is the 
inventory equation used to obtain adjusted public capital, in which δ it is 
depreciation rate and qi is the parameter of the efficacy index of public 
investment from PIMI. 
𝐾𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
′ − 𝛿𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
′ + 𝑞𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 (1) 
 
White elephant projects are a constant phenomenon among developing 
countries, which arouses doubt about the efficacy of public investment. Using 
public capital stock accumulated by public investment as a factor in growth 
decomposition and empirical research has been criticized by Pritchett (2000), 
Caselli (2004), and Robinson and Torvik (2005), since, compared to private 
investment, the efficiency of public investment is degraded more by severe 
agency problems. Treating public and private investment as the same regarding 
efficacy of capital formation makes no contribution to the understanding of 
economic performance and could be misleading in policy advising. Therefore, 
adjusting public investment by an efficacy index to accumulate public capital is 
necessary to measure the effect of public capital on economic growth and other 
macroeconomic performance like income inequality.   
The data on inequality are from SWIID5 (Solt, 2016). There are two types 
of Gini coefficient given by the SWIID dataset, namely, the market Gini 
coefficient and the net Gini coefficient. The market Gini coefficient is calculated 
from the distribution of gross income, while the net Gini coefficient is derived 
from the distribution of disposable income after tax and redistribution. The data 
on GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) which is the annual growth of per person 
gross domestic production adjusted by purchasing power parity are from the 
World Development Indicators. Financial development is captured by domestic 
credit to the private sector (% of GDP) from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. The data on institutional quality are from the Polity IV 
 
4 The accompanying 2017 Update of the Manual "Estimating Public, Private, and PPP 
Capital Stocks" 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/data/info122216.pdf) and 
IMF policy paper ”Making Public investment more efficient” 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4959) describes in great detail the 
series' definitions, the investment series' data sources, as well as the methodology in 
constructing the stock series. 
5 Version 7.1 retrieved on 2-11-2018.   
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project (2017).6 The variable we use, Polity 2, gives the combined autocracy and 
democracy score of between -10 and +10, with +10 being the highest 
(democracy) and -10 the lowest (autocracy). The data on ethnic fractionalization 
and linguistic fractionalization (0-1 continuous scale) are from the QOG 
standard dataset (2018), and the source is Alesina et al., (2003).7 The legal origin 
data is from LaPorta et al. (2008). Countries are categorized into five groups by 
the origin of their leagal system: English, French, German, Scandinavian, and 
Socialist. Because in our sample countries there is no country from the Socialist 
group (it only consists of North Korea and Myanmar), sample countries are 
grouped by the four that are left. We use the Scandinavian group as our baseline 
as the countries in this group are the most equal ones and thus, the effect that 
the other three legal origins have on income inequality can be compared with 
that of the Scandinavian legal systems. 
Figure 1 
Trend of public capital and private capital accumulation in selected countries 
A: Public capital stock B: Private capital stock 
  









Firstly, we take a look at the trend of public and private capital accumulation 
in several major economies for the last several decades. From figure1, we can 
see that the trend for public and private capital accumulation is different 
between high-income countries and low- and middle-income countries. In 
developed countries, which are exampled by the US and France, the 
accumulation of public capital and private capital is paralleled and the share of 
public capital in total capital stock has been stable over the last several decades; 
in developing countries with low economic growth in this period, strong public 
investment surpassed private investment and the share of public capital in total 
capital rose in that period; in developing countries, such as China and India, with 
high economic growth in the last several decades, accumulation of private capital 
dramatically out-paced accumulation of public capital, resulting in a huge drop 
of the share of public capital in the total capital. Overall, we were able to detect 
a conspicuous variation of the pattern of capital accumulation among these 
economies. 
Then by simply plotting public capital share against Market and Net Gini 
using 2015 data in figure 2, we notice market Gini has a more discernible 
downward trend when the share of public capital increases. A more detailed 
analysis is needed when accounting for the effect of control variables and the 
heterogeneity because of development level. 
Figure 2 
Public capital share against Gini coefficient (2015) 
A: Public capital share versus Market Gini B: Public capital share versus Net Gini 
  
Note: Abbreviations correspond to 3-letter country ISO codes. 
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In figure 3, we potted public/private capital per GDP against the Gini 
coefficient and note that the patterns of relationship between private capital per 
GDP against market Gini and net Gini are more discernible. Then we present 
the basic descriptive statistics of the variables in all regressions in table 1 and the 
correlation statistics of the variables used in our baseline regression model in 
table 2. 
Figure 3 
Public capital per GDP and private capital per GDP against Gini Coefficient (2015) 
A: Public capital per GDP versus Market Gini B: Public capital per GDP versus Net Gini 
  
C: Private capital per GDP versus Market Gini D: Private capital per GDP versus Net Gini 
  





Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Market Gini 46.70 6.60 28.94 72.35 
Net Gini 38.68 8.63 19.96 63.71 
Redistributive ratio (%) 124.96 25.26 88.52 216.00 
Labor share (%) 52.44 11.34 15.01 90 
Income  
(constant 2011$, ppp adjusted) 
14419.36 16366.91 412.09 159009.6 
Log Income 8.98 1.18 6.02 11.98 
Public capital per GDP 0.791 0.679 0.024 7.242 
Private capital per GDP 1.399 0.735 0.180 6.763 
Public Capital share ratio (%) 35.40 15.84 8.44 88.61 
Public Capital per capita  
(constant 2011$, ppp adjusted) 
10113.85 11452.42 65.41 75749.58 
Private Credit ratio (%) 46.86 42.12 0 253.57 
Broad money* (%) 63.77 461.53 1.77 18347.09 
Institutions 4.26 6.26 -10 10 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.433 0.255 0 0.930 
Linguistic Fractionalization 0.386 0.288 0.002 0.923 
Electoral Democracy 0.567 0.268 0.021 0.940 
Liberal Democracy 0.453 0.279 0.012 0.903 
Participatory Democracy 0.369 0.214 0.011 0.834 
Note: All descriptive values are for samples in column (4) of Table 3.  
The metrics for all ratio variables are %.  














Market Gini 1.0000      
Net Gini 0.6443 1.0000     
Log Income -0.0737 -0.4995 1.0000    
Public Capital Share 0.0125 0.2665 -0.3926 1.0000   
Private Credit 0.0034 -0.3449 0.6419 -0.2262 1.0000  
Institution 0.1356 -0.2556 0.4530 -0.2136 0.3723 1.0000 




3.2 Econometric methods 
We have two baseline models in our regression: one to test the effect the public 
capital share of the aggregate capital stock has on income inequality, and the 
other one to test the effect of public capital per GDP on income inequality. In 
both models, the effects on market income inequality and net income inequality 
are tested, respectively. In our first baseline model, we use a reduced-form 
equation between income inequality, public capital share, income, and other 
variables mentioned in the literature review section to identify the effect of 
public capital share on income inequality, as shown by equation (2). 
 (2) 
Where i and t is the year and country mark irrespectively; Gini means Gini 
coefficient; KPubs means the the ratio of public capital stock of total capital 
stock; X is the vector for other control variables, including income level, 
financial development, and institutional variables; Ti is the year dummies; 𝜖𝑖𝑡is 
the error term.  
 In our second baseline model, we use a reduced-form equation between 
income inequality, public capital per GDP, private capital per GDP, and other 
relevant variables to identify the effect of public capital share on income 
inequality, as showed by equation (3). Because there is a high correlation 
between GDP per capita and public capital per capita, GDP per capita is 
dropped from the control variables.   
 (2b) 
As for the techniques used in statistic models, fixed-effect OLS is applied 
for an unbalanced panel in our baseline model. As there might be an issue of 
omitted variables, the fixed effect model is fitted to give an unbiased estimation 
of the effect that our main explainable variables have on the dependent variable. 
In fixed-effect models, the means of all those unobserved country-specific 
variables are set to be non-random and the external shocks are captured by year 
dummies, giving the error term a good quality. Due to the limited inequality data 
in some countries, our panel data is unbalanced; as long as those factors behind 
the limited inequality data do not correlate with the error term, the result of 
fixed-effect regression is still unbiased. In the robustness test section, pooled 
OLS is used for those specifications with time-invariant variables. As both the 
dependant and explanatory variables are macroeconomic indicators, there is a 
concern about endogeneity in our regression model. However, the reverse 
causality from income inequality to public capital is less likely since capital stock 
is the result of cumulative processes of several decades preceding the income 
inequality that one observes for each year. In other words, the stock of public 
capital depends on the type of investment that has occurred several preceding 
decades in the past; therefore, it is more probably that public capital stock 




4 Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of public capital share on income inequality 
Public capital share, the ratio between public capital and total capital stock, could 
imply how capitalist an economy is as it gauges directly the relative size of public 
investment and indirectly the relative size of the public sector in the economy. 
As shown in the literature review section, the public capital share could have an 
equity effect because of several factors: capital market imperfection, an 
inadequate provision of public goods by the private sector, and pro-business 
policy lobbyings by the private corporations.  In table 3, we use the public capital 
share as our main explanatory variable to test its effect on market income 
inequality, net income inequality with country-fixed effects. Following Strum 
and De Haan (2015), we also test the effect of public capital share on 
redistribution in table 3.  
Table 3 
Fixed effect: effect of public capital share on income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GiniM GiniM GiniM GiniM GiniN Redis 
Log Income 1.145 0.941 0.908 0.997 1.580** -1.53 
 (0.906) (0.987) (0.961) (0.951) (0.784) (0.984) 
Public Capital Share -0.055* -0.063** -0.060** -0.065** -0.063*** 0.026 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033) 
Private Credit  0.024*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.009** 0.019 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 
Institutions   -0.083** -0.179** -0.040 -0.079** 
   (0.038) (0.086) (0.029) (0.040) 
PKxInstitutions    0.003   
    (0.002)   
constant 36.58 38.37 38.90 38.29 26.25  1.350 
N (N of countries) 4053(158) 3838(157) 3635(145) 3635(145) 3635(145) 3635(145) 
adj. R2 0.144 0.168 0.174 0.179 0.131 0.062 
Notes: GiniM means market income inequality; GiniN means net income inequality; Redis 
denotesredisitributive ratio, which is the ratio between market Gini coefficient and net Gini Coefficient; 
PKxInstitutions is the interaction term between public capital share and institutions. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. Data from 145 countries (both developed and developing) during 1980–2015, the numbers of 
countries are in parentheses. 
As shown in table 3, we find that public capital share has a consistent and 
significant negative effect on both market income inequality and net income 
inequality. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is quite stable when control 
variables are added sequentially from equation (1) to equation (3). The stability 
of the coefficients of public capital share from equation (1) to equation (3) shows 
that the association between the dependent variable and our  main  explanatory  
19 
 
variable is not sensitive to the typical specification. Overall, one standard 
deviation increase of public capital share could roughly bring down both the 
market and the net Gini coefficient by 1. For example, in 2015, Brasil’s public 
capital share was 17%, one of the lowest in the World; if its public capital share 
had reached 41%, the level of Mexico in 2015, both the market and net Gini 
would have been brought down by 1.5, its market Gini would have been just 
below that of Germany (52.4) and net Gini would have been similar to that of 
Ecuador (43.0).  In addition, we add an interaction term between public capital 
share and institutions in column (4) to see whether the impact of public capital 
on income distribution is conditional on the level of institutional quality; 
however, the interaction term does not present a significant effect. In equation 
(6), the effect of public capital share on the redistributive ratio is relatively small 
and not significant, which means public capital share does not have a discernible 
impact on redistribution.  
As mentioned in the literature review section, the results for the effect of 
private credit on inequality have been contradictory (Beck et al., 2007; Jauch and 
Watzka, 2016). In the specifications above, private credit has a consistently 
positive effect on both market inequality and net inequality when controlling the 
ownership structure of capital. This means private capital formation and credit 
expansion will benefit the rich more than the poor. Such a positive effect is in 
line with the theoretical study of Mookherjee and Ray (2003), which emphasizes 
the pecuniary externality in private investment. In appendix 3, we show the 
results when substituting private credit/GDP by Broad money (M2/GDP) ratio 
as the measurement of financial development. When excluding extreme 
inflationary cases as Zambia experienced in the early 2000s and Estonia and 
Slovak experienced in the late 2000s (M2/GDP ratio exceeds 500%), we also 
note the expansion of money supply has a consistently positive effect on both 
market income inequality and net income inequality.   
The mechanisms by which capital ownership affects income inequality 
might differ for economies in different development levels. We test the 
heterogeneity in table 4 according to the development level. Countries are 
classified into three categories (low-income developing countries, emerging 
markets, and advanced economies) in IMF Investment and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017), and the methodology of classification can be seen in the IMF 
World economic outlook (April 2017)8. We further combine the low-income 
countries and emerging markets into one category: low- and middle-income 
countries, as those countries have both not been fully industrialized in the time 
span of our dataset and have an economic structure that is discernibly different 
from advanced economies.    
When the sample is disaggregated into two subsamples according to income 
level, we note that public capital share exhibits a salient negative effect on both 
market and net inequality within the subgroup of low- and middle-income  







credit rationing and public-goods shortage differs for developed and developing 
countries, the complementary effect of public investment on private investment 
and the welfare gains of the poor from public investment also vary. From the 
results, we can anticipate that the credit rationing and shortage of public goods 
investment are much more severe in developing countries than in developed 
countries and that the poor would benefit disproportionately from public 
investment in poor countries. Another reason for this disparity is that the 
political-economy dynamic is different between developed and developing 
countries. Whereas big corporations lobby for favorable policies in developed 
countries, political and economic elites tend to seek personal benefits through 
outright corruption in developing countries. 
Table 4  
Heterogeneity according to income level 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income 2.563** 2.804*** -0.486 0.538 
 (1.208) (0.973) (1.835) (2.039) 
Public Capital Share -0.089*** -0.077*** -0.064 -0.096 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.086) (0.074) 
Private Credit 0. 118 -0.124 -0.145 -0.171 
 (1.05) (0.904) (0.732) (0.610) 
Institutions 0.004 -0.000 -0.294* -0.150 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.160) (0.149) 
constant 29.36 21.90 50.92 26.66 
N (N of countries) 2627(113) 2627(113) 1008(32) 1008(32) 
adj. R2 0.148 0.180 0.594 0.311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included  
in all equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. 
We also note that institutions only have a negative effect on the market Gini 
with a 10% significance level in high-income countries while the effect in low- 
and middle-income countries is almost null. However, the magnitude of the 
negative effect that democracy has on inequality in high-income countries has 
more than tripled than the coefficient of institutions on income inequality in 
table 3, indicating that a change from a totally authoritarian country (Polity IV 
score: -10) to a totally democratic country (Polity IV score: 10) could reduce the 
market Gini by an absolute value of 6 (0~100 range). For high-income countries, 
democracy has a significantly negative effect on the market Gini other than the 
net Gini, which implies that democracy affects income inequality through 
market regulations rather than distribution policies. A possible explanation for 
this is that in countries with well-established democratic institutions, regulations 
such as minimum wage could appeal to electorates, while redistributive policies 
face much stronger resistance from the public. For example, Bonica et al., (2013) 
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provide several reasons such as a shift of public opinion toward the deregulation 
of the economy to explain why, in the US context, a democrat system has not 
slowed the rising trend of inequality.  
Since its inception, the Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1955) has been the focus 
of studies on the evolution of inequality along the course of economic 
development. However, the reversed U-Turn Kuznets curve has failed to deliver 
itself. While the Kuznets curve held empirically as Kuznets observed the decline 
of both income and wealth inequality in industrial economies during the inter-
war periods, recent empirical evidence shows much more ambiguity in the 
evolution of inequality over time. While Dollar and Kraay (2002) show that 
economic growth raises the income share of the lowest quintiles significantly, in 
recent research, van der Weide and Milanovic (2018), using US state-level data, 
show that inequality would enlarge the income of the already rich but reduce the 
income of the poor. The interpretation of the Kuznets curve has also changed 
(Atkinson, 1997). It no longer necessarily means a quadratic relationship 
between growth and inequality, but rather can be expounded as a dynamic of 
inequality’s own evolution (Roine and Waldenstrom, 2015; p551): when 
inequality reaches a certain level, it would decline as the forces against it 
accumulate and are put into effect. Several studies (Barro, 2000; van der Weide 
and Milanovic, 2018) have shown that the association of inequality and growth 
is disparate between rich countries and poor countries, so we further test the 
existence of the Kuznets curve both for the complete sample and the separate 
samples based on income level.  
From table 5, we could find a possible Kuznets curve for low- and middle-
income countries in the period of 1980-2015, and the effect of growth on 
inequality is markedly larger for developing countries. The turning point is 
approximately 10.25 for equation (3) and 10.27 for equation (4), which means 
an income level of around $ 28283 (PPP) in 2011 constant US$. Since most 
countries in the low- and middle-income category have an income level below 
$ 28283 (PPP), economic growth would increase income inequality. One of the 
reasons for this negative growth-inequality nexus might be rent seeking by the 
political elites, as many low-income economies had tremendous political 
inequality after independence, while economic inequality is currently relatively 
low because of low-level development. In the starting phase of development, 
extremely dominant political elites would reap the benefits of early development 
(Acemoglu, 2007), and huge political inequality would thus lead to economic 
inequality. The relationship between the ratio of public capital in total capital 
and the Gini coefficient (both market and net) is also stronger for developing 
countries, which is in line with the theoretical models (Galor and Zeira, 1993). 
As the capital market and legal institutions are under-developed in poor 
countries, those who do not have access to the private credit market can make 
use of public investment to utilize their economic opportunities. Financial depth 
and institutional indicators become insignificant from column (3) to column (6) 
in table 5 when the data are subsampled by income level. The explanation for 
this would be that developing countries are generally underdeveloped in finance 
and institutional settings and their variations are small, and consequently, they 




Test for the Kuznets curve 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income -4.557 4.090 14.63*** 15.83*** -7.808 18.02 
 (5.819) (4.660) (5.581) (4.832) (22.41) (21.81) 
Log Income(sq) 0.315 -0.145 -0.714** -0.771*** 0.367 -0.875 
 (0.316) (0.255) (0.326) (0.277) (1.134) (1.129) 
Public Capital Share -0.062** -0.062*** -0.091*** -0.079*** -0.061 -0.103 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.087) (0.078) 
Private Credit 0.018*** 0.010** 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
Institutions -0.075** -0.044 -0.001 -0.006 -0.247 -0.262 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.202) (0.162) 
Constant 62.37 15.47 -20.99 -32.42 86.96 -59.37 
N (N of countries) 3635(145) 3635(145) 2627(113) 2627(113) 1008(32) 1008(32) 
adj. R2 0.178 0.133 0.171 0.214 0.594 0.317 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. The category of 
countries is based on the World Bank Countries and Lending Groups category (2017) by income level. 
Since the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts the dynamics of factor 
abundance and wage differential when economies turn from autarky to trade, 
the association between trade openness and inequality has been widely 
researched (Barro, 2000), nevertheless, with contradictory results. We test the 
effect of trade openness on inequality and find no significant effect of trade 
openness on income inequality (results are not reported here). 
4.2 Public capital per GDP’ effect on income inequality 
As the results in table 3 show that a larger share of public capital results in lower 
income inequality, a more detailed analysis is needed to discern whether the 
negative effect comes from both public capital and private capital or just one of 
them. One metric that can be applied to gauge the effect of public and private 
capital separately is the per capita level of public/private capital. Besides the 
ownership type of capital, public capital owned per person may also matter as it 
means access to public goods and services. However, since economic growth is 
universally accompanied by the accumulation of public/private capital, the high 
correlation (0.8496) between income per capita and public/private capital per 
capita renders the empirical results in a reduced-form regression confounding.  
Another metric could be the GDP level per public/private capital. As 
countries fall into similar development stages, this metric may display a very 
different composition of public and private capital, thus making the cross-
country comparison much more reliable. While public capital share indicates the 
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degree of a capitalist economy, public capital per GDP reflects whether the 
contribution of public investment to economic development is plentiful or 
insufficient. In the following table 6, we find private capital per GDP has a 
consistently significant positive effect on income inequality, while public capital 
per GDP has a negative effect on income inequality, though not statistically 
significant. Compared to the accumulation of public capital, the accumulation 
of private capital in an economy drives up inequality. The result in table 6 
corroborates the result we obtain in table 3. More specifically, this negative effect 
of public capital ratio on income inequality is attributed to the positive effect 
that private capital has on income inequality. This finding also aligns with the 
recent literature that emphasizes that the trend of rising inequality in the past 
several decades is partly attributed to private capital being able to obtain higher 
returns through international investments, while public investments are fixed 
domestically (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015).  
Table 6 
Effect of public/private capital per GDP on income inequality 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income 1.129 1.811** 2.898** 3.089*** -0.325 0.779 
 (1.037) (0.848) (1.314) (1.054) (1.714) (1.934) 
Public Capital  
per GDP 
-0.554 -0.623 -1.132** -0.931** -0.940 -1.425 
 (0.449) (0.379) (0.446) (0.399) (2.083) (1.896) 
Private Capital  
per GDP 
0.770* 0.845** 1.476*** 1.208*** 0.592 0.896 
 (0.428) (0.341) (0.371) (0.326) (0.914) (0.858) 
Private Credit  0.020*** 0.009* 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
Institutions -0.089** -0.046 -0.001 -0.005 -0.315** -0.182 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.141) (0.142) 
Constant 34.18 21.32 22.29 15.8 47.33 21.27 
N (N of 
countries) 
3635(145) 3635(145) 2627(113) 2627(113) 1008(32) 1008(32) 
adj. R2 0.168 0.123 0.147 0.174 0.592 0.303 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. The category of 
countries is based on the World Bank Countries and Lending Groups category (2017) by income level.  
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4.3 Public capital accumulation and functional distribution 
Several studies (Gollin, 2002; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) have noted a 
secular decline in the labor share of income since the 1980s. Most notably, 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) model how the decline in the relative price 
of investment goods results in a rise in the capital-labor ratio in a production 
function stylized with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) when the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is markedly above 1. As 
private capital mostly comprises industrial investment and public capital mostly 
comprises infrastructure investment and may have a different elasticity of 
substitution with labor, a different type of investment could affect labor share 
of income. Other studies (Quadrini and Rios-rull, 2015: P1258; Katz and 
Krueger, 1991) note loss of bargaining power as the main factor behind the 
decline of capital share. Here, we empirically test whether the relative size of the 
capital stock affects the labor share of income. We find that public capital share 
decreases labor share of income both in our overall samples and subsample 
consisting of developing countries in table 7. In high-income countries, there is 
a positive association between relative public capital size and labor share of 
income, but the effect is insignificant. We also test the effect that public/private 
capital per GDP has on the labor share of income, but no significant results have 
been found and the results are not reported.  
Table 7 
Public capital’s impact on the labor share of income 


















Log Income -2.406** -3.320** -3.242** -2.919* -1.753 
 (1.140) (1.398) (1.416) (1.716) (2.862) 
Public Capital 
Share 
-0.094** -0.090** -0.093** -0.11** 0.020 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.108) 
Private Credit  0.023** 0.026** 0.011 0.030** 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) 
Institutions   0.110 0.123 -0.200 
   (0.079) (0.089) (0.213) 
Constant  78.16 85.89 84.83 80.12 77.28 
N (N of countries) 4378(127) 4017(127) 3789(120) 2764(88) 1025(32) 
adj. R2 0.156 0.196 0.205 0.194 0.330 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in  
all equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. The 
category of countries is based on the World Bank Countries and Lending Groups category (2017) by 




Our result indicates that private investment is more labor-intensive than 
public investment.  The reason behind the negative impact of relative public 
capital size on labor share may be found by applying the model developed by 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Thus, the reason could be that the elasticity 
of substitution between public capital and labor is larger than the elasticity of 
substitution between private capital and labor. According to the argument of 
Quadrini and Rios-rull (2015: P1258), another reason could be that larger public 
investment relative to private investment is related to the weakening of the 
bargaining power of labor. But we test the relationship between union 
membership (an indicator of labor bargaining power) and public capital share 
and find no significant association, which implies that bargaining power might 
not be the principal reason for the impact that we find in table 7.  
4.4 Is there a top 1 percent effect of private capital 
accumulation? 
Many recent studies on income inequality claim that the rising trend of income 
inequality worldwide is mostly attributed to the rapid rise of the income share 
of the top 1 percentile. As Piketty (2014) proclaimed, the accumulation of 
private capital since World War II is the main explanation for the latest trend of 
rising inequality on a global scale attributed to the r>g mechanism. We test 
directly whether public capital accumulation is different from the accumulation 
of private capital in terms of its impact on the evolution of income distribution. 
We find that neither the relative size of public capital stock nor public capital 
per GDP has any effect on decile income share in the given dataset, although 
the coefficients change for different income groups (results presented in 
Appendix 4). We should note that the size of the sample in these two regressions 
is considerably smaller compared to the regression using the Gini coefficient 
Data provided by SWIID.  
4.5 Robustness analysis 
Our main identification strategy for econometrics is the focus on the entire 
effect, as our model captures the two main thrusts from capital accumulation to 
income inequality. Firstly, Piketty’s argument that a relatively high portion of 
private capital results in increasing income inequality as the interest rate becomes 
higher than the growth rate. Secondly, Milanovic focuses on how wealth 
concentrates at the top and income inequality emanates from such wealth 
inequality. Moreover, since capital stock is an accumulative metric of preceeding 
years’ investments, it is reasonable to infer its causal effect on income inequality 
other than the opposite direction.  
In this session, we use indicators of income inequality from another data 
source to validate the results of the former session, as well as substitute control 
variables of our baseline model with relative indicators to test the sensitivity of 





Robust test: using the Gini coefficient and Palma ratio from World development 
indicator (World Bank, 2017) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GiniWB GiniWB PalmaWB GiniWB GiniWB PalmaWB 
Log Income -0.231 -2.442 15.30 0.603 -4.572 26.16 
 (1.402) (8.791) (21.62) (1.386) (8.423) (22.94) 
Log Income (sq)  0.125   0.292  
  (0.491)   (0.470)  
Public Capital Share -0.085** -0.086** -1.842**    
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.729)    
Public Capital per GDP    -1.159** -1.222** -13.33 
    (0.538) (0.556) (11.44) 
Private Capital per GDP    2.808*** 2.839*** 39.61*** 
    (0.739) (0.719) (12.29) 
Private Credit 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.668*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.625*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.180) (0.009) (0.009) (0.189) 
Institutions -0.082 -0.079 -0.832 -0.097 -0.090 -0.994 
 (0.066) (0.066) (1.075) (0.065) (0.065) (1.046) 
Constant 45.73 55.44 165.0 32.49 55.21 -38.89 












adj. R2 0.138 0.138 0.160 0.168 0.168 0.170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. Palma ratio is 
the ratio of the income share of the top decile to the lowest 40 percent; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
In table 8, we use the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio from the World 
Development Indicators (Word Bank, 2017) to replicate the main regression 
models in the last section to test the robustness of former results. These income 
inequality measurements derive from household survey data: while the Gini 
index indicates the overall income distribution after redistribution, the Palma 
ratio represents the ratio between the income share of the top 10% and the 
income share of the bottom 40%, which depicts the severity of inequality 
between the rich and the poor. From column (1) and (2) of table 8, we notice 
that public capital share displays a negative effect on the Gini index with roughly 
similar magnitude as in table 3. Additionally, in column (3), we note that the 
extent of the effect that public capital share on the Palma ratio is much stronger 
than the effect on the Gini coefficient, which indicates that accumulation of 
public capital can reduce the income gap between the top decile and the bottom 
four deciles remarkably. The relationship between public/private capital per 
GDP on the Gini index and the Palma ratio is much more robust in column (4) 
to (6) than the results in table 6, showing a strong equity effect of public capita 
per GDP compared to the opposite effect of private capital per GDP. Overall, 
although the SWIID coverage is almost 5 times more than that provided by the 
World Bank, and the sample size becomes only 1/3 of the former regression 
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model, the pattern and the sign of the relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and our main explanatory variables remain valid. 
In table 9, we replicate our main results by substituting Polity 2 from the 
Polity IV dataset with Electoral Democracy, Liberal Democracy, and 
Participatory Democracy from the V-DEM9 dataset, which scores the different 
aspects of democratic practice from low to high (0-1). The results in table 9 are 
almost the same as we obtain in the last section, which implies that the main 
results are not sensitive to the institutional variable we use in regression models. 
By using segregated metrics of democracy from the V-Dem dataset, the 
association between strong institutions and equal distributions that we find from 
our baseline regression still holds. From Table 9, we notice that the various 
components of democracy have a consistently negative effect on the market 
Gini coefficient, with electoral democracy and participatory democracy (two of 
which enhance the majority voting system) at a 95 percent confidence level and 
liberal democracy at a 90 percent confidence level. Meanwhile, these three 
variations of democracy do not have a significant effect on the net Gini 
coefficient, as the direction of the effect is unchanged. Above all, democratic 
societies are more equal than undemocratic ones as a result of the market 
mechanism, but after redistribution of taxes and government transfer, the 
difference of income inequality between democratic and undemocratic societies 
shrinks.  
Table 9 
Robustness test: using various components of democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income 0.939 1.563** 1.001 1.598** 0.973 1.580** 
 (0.971) (0.786) (0.980) (0.792) (0.970) (0.787) 
Public Capital Share -0.060** -0.062*** -0.060** -0.062*** -0.061** -0.062*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) 
Private Credit 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 




    
 (1.109) (0.912)     
Liberal Democracy   -2.359* -1.334   
   (1.216) (1.040)   
Participatory 
Democracy 
    
-3.592** -1.797 
     (1.757) (1.472) 
Constant  39.42 26.75 38.61 26.36 39.05 26.56 
N (N of countries) 3770(151) 3770(151) 3770(151) 3770(151) 3770(151) 3770(151) 
adj. R2 0.182 0.136 0.179 0.136 0.180 0.135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. 
 




Group dummies on Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa have been widely 
used in regressions to determine the causes of inequality, and adding Anglo-
Saxon origin of countries as a control variable has also been employed in the 
literature (Roine et al., 2009). Since the colonial origin and legal origin are highly 
correlated for those countries that have been colonized and the ambiguity arises 
when dealing with countries that have not been penetrably colonized, the legal 
origin can be a more convincing indicator for institutions when using cross-
country panel data. In this paper, to obtain a much more covered grouping, we 
use legal origin (LaPorta et al., 2008) as the characteristic of the group dummy. 
Legal origin in former colonial land is mainly determined by the legal system of 
colonizers, and in those countries that have not been colonized, their legal 
origins are also highly related to the path by which they imported and 
implemented European legal systems. Usually, a certain region has the same legal 
origin due to their collective colonial history; thus, the aforementioned grouping 
per geography is captured by legal origin differences. 
Table 10 
Random-effects models: effect of public capital share on income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income 0.546 0.991 0.774 1.272* 0.882 1.331* 0.631 1.108 
 (0.794) (0.725) (0.816) (0.730) (0.831) (0.739) (0.802) (0.717) 
Public Capital  
Share 
-0.059** -0.059*** -0.057** -0.060*** -0.058** -0.061*** -0.059** -0.059*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) 
Private Credit 0.020*** 0.009** 0.021*** 0.010** 0.022*** 0.010** 0.020*** 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Institutions -0.082** -0.047 -0.087** -0.050* -0.089** 0.051* 0.080** -0.044 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.039) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
  4.904 15.45***     
   (3.059) (3.346)     
Language 
Fractionalization 
    3.515 9.766***   
     (2.703) (2.817)   
English Origin       6.376*** 20.80*** 
       (2.327) (2.215) 
French Origin       4.320** 19.38*** 
       (2.112) (1.759) 
German Origin       -0.303 7.571*** 
       (1.835) (1.651) 
Constant 41.97 31.70 37.60 22.25 37.25 24.51 37.06 13.00 
Random-effect models with year dummies included in all equations, Robust standard errors in parentheses,  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. Religious fractionalization has 
also been tested by the author, which shows it has less significant effect. There are four categories of legal 
origin, and Scandinavian legal origin is the baseline of our specification.  
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We further test our hypothesis with random-effects models in table 10; we 
replicate our baseline specifications in column (1) and column (2), and also add 
widely used time-invariant variables from column (3) to (8). In all those 
specifications, the coefficients for public capital share change marginally from 
results in fixed-effects models. All fractionalization indicators are positively 
correlated with income inequality, which aligns with theoretical models (Becker, 
1957) and empirical studies (Alesina et al., 1999 and Gershman and Rivera, 
2018). Moreover, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization have a much larger and 
significant effect on net income inequality, which is in line with the previous 
literature (Sturm and De haan, 2015) that shows ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
could stymie redistribution. When compared to Scandinavian countries, the legal 
system originating from Anglo-Saxon tradition has the largest positive effect on 
income inequality, followed by the French and German origin in sequence. It 
should also be pointed out that, similar to indicators of fractionalization, the 
effect of legal origin on net income inequality is notably larger than the effect on 




Our paper falls into the literature that uses market-structure differences among 
economies to explain cross-country variations in income distribution. In this 
paper, we set forth an empirical analysis of the association between relative 
public capital size and income inequality while controlling for financial 
development and institutional quality. The notion that a capitalist economy 
tends to be more unequal has a long history; however, our work is among the 
first ones to empirically test this hypothesis. Our main finding is that public 
capital has an equity effect when it is measured by its share in total capital stock 
rather than in absolute value accounted for by the total population. While public 
capital share has a consistently negative effect on both market and net income 
inequality, the difference between the effect of public capital on market income 
inequality and net income inequality is essentially negligible, which implies there 
is no redistributive effect of public capital accumulation. We find that 
public/private capital per GDP (as a measurement of the economy’s reliance on 
public or private investment) has the opposite effect on income inequality, 
which could further explain the negative effect that public capital share has on 
income inequality. Thus, a capitalist economy has proved to be much more 
unequal, with the market mechanism playing a decisive role in such an 
association as the extent of the capitalist economy has almost no redistributive 
effect.  
Moreover, our finding also has policy implications. While efficient-adjusted 
public capital could enhance productivity as the aforementioned literature 
shows, it has also proved to have an equity effect. Accordingly, a more accessible 
credit market for the poor can be created through public financing, and the 
government can provide public goods and invest in infrastructures.  These 
measures could enhance the capacity of the poor to invest in themselves and 
engage in productive activities that would give rise to social mobility. 
Furthermore, in light of the ambiguity of the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality in the existing literature, we find that both 
private credit expansion and an increase of broad money would aggravate 
income inequality. This empirical evidence indicates that privatized financial 
development is not an optimal option for policy-makers to take when they try 
to avoid the rapid increase of inequality in the course of financial development. 
Further research can focus on how to improve the efficiency of public 
investment. The main limitation of this paper is that we were unable to estimate 
which income deciles benefit from a larger public capital presence in the 
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List of countries in our baseline model 
Country name Fre Country name Fre Country name Fre Country name Fre 
Albania 17 Dominican Republic 30 Kyrgyzstan  20 Portugal  34 
Algeria  24 Ecuador 29 Laos 19 Qatar 26 
Angola 10 Egypt  36 Latvia 20 Russia 23 
Argentina 34 El Salvador 25 Lebanon 2 Rwanda  29 
Armenia 22 Equatorial Guinea 1 Lesotho  22 Senegal  21 
Australia  35 Estonia 21 Liberia  10 Serbia 10 
Austria  30 Ethiopia 14 Lithuania  20 Sierra Leone 32 
Azerbaijan 17 Fiji 34 Luxembourg 27 Singapore 36 
Bangladesh  29 Finland 34 Macedonia 22 Slovak republic 22 
Belarus 22 France 33 Madagascar 33 South Africa  35 
Belgium 33 Gabon  1 Malawi 33 Spain  34 
Benin 14 Gambia 23 Malaysia  36 Sri Lanka  36 
Bhutan 10 Georgia 21 Mali  16 Sudan 30 
Bolivia  26 Germany  22 Mauritania  13 Suriname 7 
Botswana 26 Ghana 27 Mauritius  26 Swaziland 25 
Brazil 33 Greece 36 Mexico  36 Sweden 36 
Bulgaria 25 Guatemala  34 Moldova 21 Switzerland 36 
Burkina Faso 21 Guinea 8 Mongolia 21 Syria  11 
Burundi  22 Guinea-Bissau  18 Montenegro 9 Tajikistan  15 
Cambodia 16 Haiti  12 Morocco 27 Tanzania  28 
Cameroon 19 Honduras 28 Mozambique  19 Thailand  34 
Canada 29 Hungary 25 Myanmar (Burma) 6 Togo 11 
Cape Verde 17 India 33 Namibia 13 Trinidad and Tobago  26 
Central African 
Republic  
17 Indonesia 36 Nepal  31 Tunisia  28 
Chad  9 Iran 35 Netherlands  33 Turkey  29 
Chile  36 Iraq 3 New Zealand  29 Uganda  22 
China 29 Ireland 34 Nicaragua 22 Ukraine 23 
Colombia  34 Israel 36 Niger 23 United Kingdom  27 
Comoros  10 Italy  34 Nigeria  26 United States  36 
Congo Brazzaville 7 Ivory coast 31 Norway  36 Uruguay  35 
Costa Rica 36 Japan  35 Pakistan  34 Venezuela  34 
Croatia 21 Jordan 29 Panama  36 Vietnam 20 
Cyprus 31 Kazakhstan 21 Paraguay  26 Yemen  22 
Czech Republic 22 Kenya  28 Peru 36 Zambia  29 
Denmark  36 Korea South  36 Philippines 36 Zimbabwe  11 






Variable  Indicator  Data sources  
GiniM  Market Gini, Gini coefficient of income inequality before 
taxes and transfers taken into account. The index ranging 
between 0 and 100, with larger values corresponding to 
more unequal income distributions 
Solt(2009) 
GiniN  Net Gini, Gini coefficient of income inequality (net of taxes 
and transfers). The index ranging between 0 and 100, with 
larger values corresponding to more unequal income 
distributions 
Solt (2009) 
Redistributive ratio The ratio between GiniM and GiniN Solt (2009) 
Top One percent The income share of the top 1 percent population in income 
distribution 
Wid.world 
Top Ten percent The income share of the top 10 percent population in income 
distribution 
Wid.world 
Middle class The income share of the 50 percent to 10 percent of the 
population in income distribution 
Wid.world 
Bottom half  The income share of the lower half of the population in 
income distribution 
Wid.world 
PalmaWID Palma ratio of market distribution by using WID data  Wid.world 
Labour share  Share of labor income in GDP  Penn world trade  
Income Real GDP per capita (purchasing-power-parity-adjusted 
constant 2011 US dollars) 
IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017) 
Log Income Natural logarithm of the Income variable  IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017) 
Public capital per GDP Public capital stock (PPP-adjusted constant 2011 US 
dollars) divided by gross domestic product (PPP-adjusted 
constant 2011 US dollars) 
IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017) 
Private capital per GDP Private capital stock (PPP-adjusted constant 2011 US 
dollars) divided by gross domestic product (PPP-adjust-
constant 2011 US dollars) 
IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017) 
Public capital share Public capital stock (PPP-adjusted constant 2011 US 
dollars) divided by the total of public capital stock and private 
capital stock (PPP-adjusted constant 2011 US dollars) 
IMF Investment 
and Capital Stock 
Dataset (2017) 
Private credit Domestic credit to the private sector by banks (% of GDP) World Bank 
(2017) 
Broad Money M2 (% of GDP) World Bank 
(2017) 








Institutions Polity 2 index (in the range between −10 to 10) from the 
Polity IV Project measuring the democratic accountability of 
the political system. Higher values corresponding to greater 
democratic rule 








Linguistic fractionalisation index (0-1 continuous scale) Alesina et al., 
(2003) 
Legal Origin The origin of the legal system is categorized by similarity as 
five groups. 
LaPorta et al. 
(2008) 
Electoral democracy An indicator of electoral competition between political parties 





Liberal democracy An indicator of the extent to which individual and minority 
rights are protected against the tyranny of the state and the 





Participatory democracy An indicator of the extent of active participation of the 






Broad Money (M2/GDP) as an indicator of financial development 





 (1) (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) 
 GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN GiniM GiniN 
Log Income 1.616* 1.944*** 2.350** 2.638*** 1.077 1.722 
 (0.893) (0.738) (1.006) (0.836) (2.190) (2.519) 
Public Capital Share -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.087*** -0.075*** 0.043 -0.020 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.074) (0.080) 
Broad Money 0.021** 0.017* 0.011 0.006 -0.006 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) 
Institutions -0.063* -0.038 0.002 -0.001 -0.311** -0.243 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.135) (0.149) 
Constant 33.69 24.83 30.71 23.01 30.71 12.72 
N (N of countries) 3139(130) 3139(130) 2614(112) 2614(112) 525(18) 525(18) 
adj. R2 0.171 0.175 0.150 0.179 0.736 0.517 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. The category of 




Is there a top income effect of public/private capital stock 
A: capital ownership and decile income share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Bottom half Middle 
class 
Top ten Top one  Palma 
Ratio 
Log Income  -2.690* -3.269* 5.783** 3.153** 0.616 
 (1.474) (1.694) (2.347) (1.400) (1.023) 
Public capital share 0.0259 -0.0453 0.0144 0.0523 0.0180 
 (0.0534) (0.0535) (0.0828) (0.0605) (0.0499) 
Private Credit -0.0129 -0.00442 0.0122 0.00346 0.00715 
 (0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0175) (0.00754) 
Institutions -0.137* -0.0646 0.117 0.127 0.125 
 (0.0767) (0.0709) (0.134) (0.0937) (0.0784) 
Constant 43.78 71.65 -13.87 -19.97 -1.837 
N (N of countries) 577(25) 577(25) 605(27) 619(27) 559(24) 
adj. R2 0.353 0.283 0.362 0.284 0.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. Palma 
ratio is the top ten percent income share divided by bottom 40 percent income share; * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The decile income share data are from World Inequality Database10. 
 
B: Public capital per GDP and decile income share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Bottom half Middle 
class 
Top ten Top one Palma 
Ratio 
Log Income  -2.704** -3.072 5.662** 3.058** 0.436 
 (1.246) (1.836) (2.484) (1.437) (0.810) 
Public Capital per 
GDP  
-1.668 -2.044 3.489 2.496 1.707 
 (1.259) (1.871) (2.284) (1.469) (1.103) 
Private Capital per 
GDP 
-1.220 0.965 0.123 -1.717 0.187 
 (0.779) (1.154) (1.492) (1.263) (0.753) 
Private Credit -0.0147 -0.00510 0.0140 0.00492 0.00846 
 (0.0116) (0.0170) (0.0226) (0.0180) (0.00630) 
Institutions -0.149* -0.0612 0.115 0.127 0.128 
 (0.0776) (0.0674) (0.136) (0.0886) (0.0782) 
Constant 47.86*** 68.39*** -15.13 -16.87 -0.993 
 (12.02) (18.21) (23.13) (13.27) (7.281) 
N (N of countries) 577(25) 577(25) 605(27) 619(27) 559(24) 
adj. R2 0.396 0.291 0.378 0.302 0.059 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, country fixed-effects models with year dummies included in all 
equations, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers of countries are in parentheses. Palma ratio 
is the top ten percent income share divided by bottom 40 percent income share; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. The decile income share data are from World Inequality Database.  
 
10 https://wid.world  
